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In 1992 virtually all the countries of the world signed, and ratiﬁed, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change whose ultimate objective is
to achieve the ’stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inference with the climate
system’. Five years later, the Kyoto Protocol was signed, engaging the countries
included in Annex I (OECD and economies in transition) to reduce their overall
emission by ﬁve per cent in 2012 compared to 1990. This agreement was after-
wards further discussed and reﬁned, and in 2001, almost all the countries of the
world (with the only signiﬁcant absence of the United States of America) agreed
on the Marrakech Accords, which are expected to permit the Kyoto Protocol
to come into force (this requires that countries accounting for 55% of Annex I
carbon dioxide emissions ratify it1).
Although it is fair to acknowledge that the industrialized countries (IC) are the
main historic, and present, causers of anthropogenic climate change, the solution
of the problem will need the implication of the developing countries (DC) in a
more comprehensive way than the one proposed in the Kyoto Protocol (based on
projects). This is especially true if we assume that the DC will be able to develop
as fast as they need. In fact, the incorporation of the DC is the main issue on
the negotiation agenda and the absence of binding targets for the DC was one of
the main arguments used by President Bush to reject the Kyoto Protocol.
In the next negotiation rounds we shall see the North (the Annex-I countries
which have ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol) negotiating with the South (Non-Annex
I countries) the most convenient way to bring them on board. The North, led by
the European Union, has recognized its historical responsibility (in oﬃcial texts
but also accepting to be the ﬁrst one to reduce) and should be ready to com-
pensate in some way the South for accepting limitations to their urgently needed
development. This compensation could take the form of monetary transfers but
could also be based on other type of advantages.
Until now the DC have talked in the international climate change arena with
a single voice, the so-called ”G77 and China” group. Nevertheless, until now, the
DC, although Parties of the negotiations, have not been aﬀected by binding reduc-
tions and therefore somehow less involved in the ”hard part” of the negotiations.
In the new context, the Southern countries have to decide whether they continue
to talk with a single voice or whether they split up into two or more groups (the
G77 and China is a highly heterogeneous group, including small countries highly
vulnerable to climate change and countries like Saudi Arabia strongly interested
in oil exports). Talking together gives bargaining power, but under some circum-
stances, it may be more convenient to split up to take advantage of the internal
diﬀerences. Rotillon et al. (1996) analysed this issue with complete information
1As well as 55 countries, including Annex I as well as Non-Annex I countries.
2and particular beneﬁt functions. Nevertheless, oﬃcial statistics in the South are
rare and incomplete and real knowledge about the abatement costs and options
in the South are not at all available to the North. On the contrary, due to the
high amount of existing studies, and due to the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, the South will have almost complete information about the cost and
beneﬁt functions of the North. Hence, we discuss this issue in the context of
asymmetric information and with general functional forms.
Finally, if the Southern countries decide to split up into two groups (e.g.),
these groups can be complementary or substitutable.W ec a l lt h e mcomplementary
if the North needs to sign an agreement with both groups to be eﬀective, and
substitutable if an agreement with one of the groups is enough to produce positive
beneﬁts. At ﬁrst glance, the Southern groups should be considered substitutable
in the case of climate change since if one group, e.g. representing 50% of the
Southern emissions, accepts to reduce its future emissions (or to increase them
less) this will have a positive eﬀect on climate change. Nevertheless, the opposite
situation is also possible. As described above, in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was
signed, but stating that it will only come into force if countries representing 55%
of Annex I emissions ratify it. This gave, especially after the withdrawal of the
United States, Russia and other countries a lot of bargaining power since they
became complementary. This situation might be repeated if an initial Protocol
states that the DC will only be obliged to reduce their emission patterns if DC
representing 55% (e.g.) of Non-Annex I emissions ratify it2. Hence, we discuss
in our model the circumstances under which the South is interested in pushing
for such a situation.
Another relevant characteristic of international negotiations, and in particular
of the climate change negotiations, is that they take a great deal of time to
conclude. In principle, if negotiators were eﬃcient, we should expect them to
ﬁnish in one single negotiation round. Nevertheless, the delay in the negotiations
can be used, and has been used in the past, to take advantage and to gain
better knowledge of the characteristics of the opponent. Therefore, we model the
negotiations in a dynamic framework to analyse the circumstances under which
the Parties beneﬁt from delaying the agreement.
Game theory literature on cooperation in the context of climate change has
followed two approaches3, although both of them assimilate cooperation and co-
ordination of environmental policies. On the one hand, we have what Tulkens
(1998) called the thesis of the ”little stable coalitions” (Carraro and Siniscalco,
1993; Barret, 1994; Péreau and Tazdaït, 2001; among others). On the other
hand, we have the thesis of the ”grand stable coalition” (Chander and Tulkens,
1997; Egteren and Tang, 1997; Funaki and Yamato, 1999; Helm, 2001; among
others). According to the ﬁrst approach, only a small number of countries will
2In fact, this kind of clause is common in international agreements.
3For a survey see Finus (2001).
3accept to sign an agreement (the stability concept used comes from the analysis
of cartels in industrial economics). In this framework, a coalition including all
the countries is not sustainable since the beneﬁts arising from cooperation are
a public good (distributed to all countries), while the costs are borne only by
the countries forming the coalition. On the contrary, in the second approach all
the countries are interested in cooperation (taken individually or in sub-groups).
According to Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) an agreement should not only
be based on pareto optimality to be eﬀective, but should also prevent any sub-
group of countries to be interested in secession. Hence, the objective is to set up
a burden-sharing rule able to favour the cooperation of all. However, these two
approaches have in common that the negotiating process has been completely
ignored, as well as signiﬁcant characteristics like the information asymmetry,
countries heterogeneity4, or even the possibilities of renegotiation. In the non-
cooperative games evoked by Carraro and Siniscalco, negotiation is modelled as
simultaneous discourse, not leaving any space to dialogue (i.e. the possibility of
carrying out counter-propositions). In the models of endogenous coalition forma-
tion (Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997), cooperation is the result of the direct
intervention of a third party: a supranational authority acting as a central plan-
ner. This central planner is assumed to be good-willed, to defend the global
interests and to have enforcement power; somehow irrealistic assumptions in the
context of real climate change negotiations.
To overcome these limitations, we analyse future climate change negotiations
in a dynamic framework, with asymmetric information, with heterogeneous coali-
tions and explicitly including the possibility to make counter-propositions. In
technical terms, we develop a sequential game with asymmetric information in
a bilateral, as well as in a multilateral framework. This model is set out using
general functional forms and could therefore be applied to most of the current
and future discussions between the North and the South; and, more generally, in
all circumstances where negotiations take place between one player, whose char-
acteristics are well known and who is ready to pay the other players to obtain
something, and one or two players whose characteristics are only partially known.
The article is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the general model.
In section 3, we analyse the outcomes of the game with complete information.
The study of the negotiation with incomplete information is proposed in section
4. Finally, section 5 highlights the main conclusions.
4Most of the work with heterogeneous countries is based on numerical simulations (Barrett,
1997; Botteon and Carraro, 1997, 1998) and hence does not provide general results. The the-
oretical work available has been developed within the highly restricted framework of countries
characterised by speciﬁc welfare functions (Hoel, 1992; Heal, 1994).
42T h e m o d e l
We analyse a bargaining game between the North (Annex I countries which have
ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol), which is assumed to be neutral to risk, and a group
of developing countries (e.g. the G77 and China). The negotiation is about the
value of the transfers that the North (N) will grant to countries of the South (S)
willing to cooperate and commit themselves. The Southern countries are assumed
to be identical and C in number. To assume identical countries could be seen as
a limitation (see above); however, it is important to recall that we are assuming
that all the countries of the Southern coalition talk with a single voice. Therefore,
there is no problem in considering that a country like China has more votes (parts
of C) in the internal vote (in fact, C could also refer to the amount of emissions
as in the example described in the introduction). We call 0 < δi < 1 the discount
rate of agent i, i = N,S . The beneﬁtf o rt h eN o r t hi st h ed i ﬀerence between the
abatement reached (B(C)=B), and the cost of the transfers to the C countries
of the Southern coalition (τC):
Π(τ,t)=δ
t
N[B − τC] (1)
The utility function of the Southern coalition is:
U(τ,t)=δ
t
S[(τ − b)C] (2)
We assume that the minimum amount of transfers (or other type of advantages)
a s k e df o rb yt h eS o u t h e r nc o a l i t i o n( b)i sd e c i d e di na ni n t e r n a lv o t ea m o n gt h e
coalition (as it occurs in the international negotiations, where G77 and China have
private meetings where they decide their position). With this amount of transfers
b the utility is zero. We also deﬁne the ”reservation transfer”, as the maximum
transfer that the North can accept. This amount is given by the beneﬁts that the
North obtains from the reductions in the South (we assume that the negotiation is
about the amount of transfers for a given level of Southern eﬀort). The maximum
transfer level is B/C,a n dt h eb e n e ﬁtf o rt h eN o r t hw o u l db ez e r o .T h a ti s ,t h e
negotiation area is bounded by b and B/C.T h u s ,f o rB/C < b,t h ea g r e e m e n t
set is empty. To make the agreement possible, we suppose B>C b .A l l t h e
elements of the negotiation are known, except the minimum amount of transfers
that is acceptable to the Southern group. This amount can have two possible
values b− or b+,w h e r eb− <b + <B / C . The Northern negotiator has an apriori
probability function for these values: pN(b+)=p+ and pN(b−)=p− =1− p+.
T h ep l a y e r sp r o p o s eo ﬀers alternatively, which refer to the amount of transfers
for a given eﬀort. The negotiation goes on with no time limit. We call the game
where the North (respectively the South) makes the ﬁrst oﬀer J∞
N (J∞
S ). Let us
analyse the structure of the J∞
N game.
The North proposes an amount of transfers τN. The South accepts (Yes) or
refuses (No) the proposition. If the South accepts an agreement is signed in the
5ﬁrst period. The objective functions of the agents are:
Π(τN,0) = B − τNC and U(τN,0) = (τN − b)C
If the South rejects the oﬀer, the negotiation continues with a counter-oﬀer from
the South. If the North accepts this new oﬀer, an agreement is signed in the
second period, with an amount of transfers τS.T h u s :
Π(τS,1) = δN[B − τSC] and U(τS,1) = δS[(τS − b)C]




N[B − τNC] and U(τN,2) = δ
2
S[(τN − b)C]
And so on. In the case of perpetual disagreement we get :
Π(τ0,∞) < Π(τ,t) and U(τ0,∞) <U(τ,t) for the ﬁnal t.
We assume that both agents have a given preference for the present. Hence, for
two moments in time t and s,w i t ht<s ,w eh a v e :
Π(τ,t) ≥ Π(τ,s) and U(τ,t) ≥ U(τ,s)
with τ = b−,b +. The inequality will be strict if Π > 0 (respectively U>0).
This time preference can be explained since there are no beneﬁts for the two parts
during the negotiations.
Since the acceptation of an oﬀer closes the negotiation, an history in time t,
ht, describes a possible evolution of the negotiations from the beginning at date
0 until date t (including the behaviour in t). More precisely, it gives the sequence
of propositions leading to a disagreement, if there were propositions, knowing
that the North revises its believes taking into account the history. Call H the
set of all the possible histories and Ht the set of all the possible histories with a







+] ∪ (Yes, No)




i ) the behaviour of i at time t.I n p a r -
ticular, it tells us if after h
t−1
i , i will propose a new oﬀer, or refuse or accept
the oﬀer of j. Hence, a history is formed either by a proposition between b−
and b+, or by a refusal or an acceptation. This last choice can only appear at
t. The result of the negotiation will also depend upon the beliefs of the North.
The resolution of the dynamic game with incomplete information is based on the
concept of sequential equilibrium (Kreps et Wilson, 1982). By deﬁnition, a set
of strategies and a family of beliefs form a sequential equilibrium if the following
two conditions hold: (i) the strategies of both players are optimal in all the points
of the game, given the believes of the North, and (ii) the beliefs of the North are
Bayesian5.
5We could also adopt a perfect bayesian equilibrium concept. However, as Kreps and Wilson
63 Complete information
3.1 Bilateral negotiation
Following a similar resolution method to the one proposed by Rubinstein (1982),
we calculate the unique perfect equilibrium with complete information to which
both players agree immediately in the ﬁrst negotiation round (see Hovi (2001)
for an alternative application of this methodology to the Clean Development
Mechanism). The minimum amount of transfers b requested by S is supposed
to be common knowledge. Let τ∗(N,S) be the equilibrium transfer when the
North opens the negotiations and τ∗(S,N) the equilibrium transfer when it was
proposed by the South6. We obtain:
τ
∗(N,S)=






B(1 − δN)+bCδN(1 − δS)
(1 − δNδS)C
(4)
Concerning the position of the players in the game, we can formulate the
following corollary. It says that N (respectively S) prefers to play the game
w h e r ei to p e n st h en e g o t i a t i o n s( J∞
N , respectively J∞
S ), instead of the opposite
where it responds (J∞
S , respectively J∞
N ).
.
Corollary 1 If J∞
N and J∞
S are two games with perfect information, being b











Proof. We can see that:
τ
∗(S,N) > τ
∗(N,S) ⇐⇒ B>C b
Since by deﬁnition B>C b , the inequality always holds.
S wishes to obtain the highest amount of transfers and prefers the situation where
τ = τ∗(S,N), i.e. the amount of transfers that it obtains in the game where it
talks ﬁrst. On the contrary, N wishes to obtain the lowest amount of transfers
and prefers the situation where τ = τ∗(N,S), i.e. the amount of transfers that it
obtains in the game where it talks ﬁrst.
(1982) show, this concept has the drawback that it deﬁnes a great amount of solutions, while
the sequential equilibrium permits to restrain them.
6These transfer equilibria are derived from a backward induction reasoning (Rubinstein,
1982).
73.2 Multilateral negotiation
Let us now consider the case where the South is organised in two separate groups,
Si, i =1 ,2, representing Ci countries, with C1 + C2 = C.T h eb e n e ﬁt obtained
by the North from the abatement of group i is noted Bi, i =1 ,2.T h ea i mi st o
study the union and disunity behaviours of the groups in complete information
according to their degree of complementarity and substitutability. We assume
that within each group, the members vote to determine their minimum level
of transfer claims. Let bi (i =1 ,2) be the transfer requested by the group i
(resulting from the internal vote within each group) and b the transfer requested
by the groups while acting together (resulting from the internal vote within the
group formed by both sub-groups).
The bargaining process has the same characteristics as previously described.
T h eg a m ec o n s i s t si na l t e r n a t i v eo ﬀers and the North makes the initial oﬀers
(one to each group) If one group accepts the oﬀer while the other refuses, the
negotiation with the former group is ﬁnished; going on with the latter group. If
both groups simultaneously refuse (accept), the negotiation keeps going on (ends)
with both groups. This process goes on until an agreement is reached.
Let 0 < δS < 1 be the ﬁxed discount rate of the groups (joined or separated).
We have ∀i =1 ,2 :
τ
∗(N,Si)=
biCi(1 − δS)+δS(1 − δN)Bi
(1 − δNδS)Ci
(5)
Both groups will accept to form a unique alliance if, by their cohesion, they reach
a more satisfactory level than they would have reached acting separately:
U1 + U2 <U (6)
where Ui is the utility of the groups (∀i =1 ,2). Condition (6) involves:
bC − b1C1 − b2C2 <B− B1 − B2 (7)
Let us deﬁne Vi =( B − bC) − (Bj − bjCj), i 6= j, the maximum contribution of
group i to the beneﬁt of the North. Condition (7) is rewritten as follows:
V1 + V2 >B− bC (8)
The two Southern groups should act together when the North beneﬁts from ne-
gotiating separately with each of them. This only happens if the distribution rule
among the members of the Southern group allows them to obtain more together
than what they would obtain separately. The North is only motivated to favour
two bilateral negotiations if it intends to propose a low level of transfers. In this
conﬁguration, by standing separately, the bargaining power of the South is lower,
as their threat to refuse any agreement is less credible. If one group tries to use
8that threat, the North will propose a slightly more interesting oﬀer to the other
group. Being confronted with two distinct groups, it could propose a low level of
transfers and take advantage of the disunity and lead both Southern groups to
accept its oﬀer. To foil that strategy, the two groups have to act together.
If condition (8) is not respected, the Southern groups should participate sep-
arately in the negotiations. In this case, the North is inclined to propose a high
level of transfers from the beginning of the negotiation. Since the North pro-
poses a high level of transfers, its intention is to conclude an agreement as soon
as possible . Each group is therefore incited to take advantage of that situation
by accepting the overbid game. The separation of the groups accentuates this
behaviour and increases their bargaining power. Hence, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1
1. When V1 + V2 >B− bC, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists in
which the groups act jointly.
2. When V1 + V2 <B− bC, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists in
which the groups act separately.
The outcome of the negotiations depends widely on the degree of commitment
of the North. It deﬁnes the whole process of negotiations by making the ﬁrst oﬀer.
If the Southern countries anticipate a moderated commitment, they will be united
during the negotiations, since that will give them signiﬁcant bargaining power.
Conversely, if they anticipate a high commitment, they will be dissociated into
two separate groups.
We will now analyse the behaviour of the Southern groups according to their
degree of substitutability and complementarity. The groups are said complemen-
tary when the two groups have to sign the agreement so that beneﬁts can arise
(see introduction). They are called substitutable when the agreement can be
reached with only one of the groups. If we accept perfect complementarity, an
agreement signed by only one group has no impact. Therefore, ∀Ci, i =1 ,2,w e
have V1 = V2 =0 .H e n c e :
V1 + V2 <B− bC (9)
Since relation (9) always holds for the complementary groups, we assume that
they will act separately during negotiations. In this way both can unilaterally
compromise the negotiations in case of disagreement. On the other hand, when
the groups are substitutable, they had better act together to preserve their bar-
gaining power. The following expression is found inverting equation 6:
V1 + V2 >B− bC (10)
9According to the North, the inequality (10) means that the maximum ad-
ditional contribution to the Northern payoﬀ of the two united groups is low.
Thus, an agreement with one of the groups is enough. We obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2
1. When the two groups are perfectly complementary, they will act separately.
2. When the two groups are perfectly substitutable, they will act jointly.
When the Southern groups are complementary; the North would like to ne-
gotiate with the united groups. Conversely, the Southern groups will adopt the
asymmetric behaviour. Being complementary, they are aware of being the driving
forces and that incites them to be dissociated into two distinct groups. Such be-
haviour gives them bargaining power and allows them to request a higher amount
of transfers.
When the groups are substitutable; the North needs to conclude an agreement
with only one of them. Conversely, the Southern groups are incited to act united
to preserve their bargaining power. Nevertheless, that alliance is fragile since one
of the groups can betray its partner accepting a slightly lower level of transfers,
which guarantees the signing of an agreement.
4 One-sided incomplete information
4.1 Bilateral negotiation
We now analyse the game in which the North opens the negotiations and does
not know the amount of transfers requested by the Southern countries. We might
justify this situation as follows: the North has complete, easily accessible statis-
tics, as well as a high amount of studies estimating the costs of climate change
policy in the North. In addition, the North (formed by the IC which have ratiﬁed
the Kyoto Protocol) will have started its climate change policy and revealed its
reduction potentials. On the contrary, in most of the Southern countries statistics
are incomplete and the knowledge about the cost of alternative climate change
policies is not well known. Therefore, the South has better information about
the amount of transfers that it can request compared to the information available
to the North about the minimum level of transfers (or other beneﬁts) that the
South would accept.
To simplify, we assume that the amount transfers requested by the Southern
group can only take two values: b− or b+,w i t hb− <b + <B / C .E i t h e r i t i s
l o w ,a n dw ew i l lc a l lt h eg r o u pt y p eb−, or it is high and the group will be of
type b+. According to Harsanyi (1967), this game is formalised by introducing a
10new player, Nature, which selects the group b+ (respectively b−)a st h eN o r t h e r n
opponent with probability p+ (respectively 1−p+). The distribution of probability
is common knowledge.
Since we use the concept of sequential equilibrium, we have to specify the
f o r mo ft h eb e l i e f so ft h eN o r t h .W ew i l ld e ﬁne pessimistic beliefs (Rubinstein,
1988). Hence, each time an event of probability zero appears, the North considers
that it is facing b+7.
The relation b− <b + <B / Cmeans that the North is in a position of strength
faced with b−, while it is in a position of weakness faced with b+ (who has stronger
transfer demands). Within the game in complete information, the equilibrium
transfer issued from the negotiation with b+ is higher or equal to the equilibrium






With one-sided incomplete information, b− is interested in persuading the North
that it has strong demands. Therefore, its strategy consists in adopting behaviour
similar to b+.L e m m a s( 1)t o( 4) show this result.
Lemma 1 If in any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞
N ,t w ot y p e so f
Southern groups propose a counter-oﬀer, they will make the same one. In this
case, b− is interested in suggesting a counter-oﬀer identical to the one proposed
by b+.
Lemma 2 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞
N :
a) If b− refuses a proposition τN, b+ is interested in doing as well.
b) Conversely, if b+ accepts a proposition τN,i ti si nt h ei n t e r e s to fb− to do
as well.
Lemma 3 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞
N , a group, whatever its type,
will accept any oﬀer τN verifying:
τN ≥ (1 − δS)b + δSτ
∗(S
+,N) (12)
As the range of possibilities of b− is larger than the one of b+, there are levels
of transfer τN l i k e l yt ob ea c c e p t e db yt h eﬁrst and refused by the second. The
following lemma (4) conﬁrms that.
Lemma 4 In any sequential equilibrium of J∞





− ≤ τN (13)
7We retain that type of beliefs among the family of possible beliefs (optimistics, passives or
continued ) since they are the most economically relevant within this model.
11b− accepts the proposition τN while b+ rejects it and oﬀers τ∗(S+,N),w h i c hw i l l
be accepted by N.
Lemmas (1)t o( 4) lead us to propositions (3)t o( 5) for the one-sided incom-
plete information game.
Proposition 3 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞
N where the North is
characterised by pessimistic beliefs and where equation (13) is veriﬁed, we obtain





B(1 − δN)+C[δNτ∗(S+,N) − τN]
= g
The North proposes the level of transfers τN. b− accepts it while b+ refuses
it to make a counter-oﬀer τ∗(S+,N), accepted by the North.
2. If p+ >g , the North proposes the level of transfers τ∗(N,S+) which is
immediately accepted by the Southern groups whatever their type.
3. If p+ = g, two cases are conceivable:
- Either the North proposes the transfer τ∗(N,S+) which is immediately
accepted by the Southern group, whatever its type.
-Or it proposes the transfer τN verifying (13) but it is refused by b+.T h e
counter-oﬀer of b+ is then equal to τ∗(S+,N) a n di sa c c e p t e db yt h eN o r t h .
The results of this proposition show that the asymmetry of information totally
favours b− as it is incited to adopt opportunistic behaviour. The North can
however determine the real characteristic of its opponent. For that, it just has
to propose a transfer τN verifying (13) which will be a suﬃcient incentive for
b− to accept and give up the option of making a counter-oﬀer. Nevertheless,
since τN > τ∗(N,S−), b−, although forced to reveal its characteristics, beneﬁts
from its opportunism. Let us add that the situation of the North is even more
unfavourable if equation (13) is not veriﬁed. The following proposition illustrates
this situation.
Proposition 4 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞
N where the North
is characterised by pessimistic beliefs and where the relation (13) is not veriﬁed,
if the North opens the negotiations proposing τ∗(N,S−),i tw i l lb er e f u s e db yt h e
Southern groups whatever their type.
However, the asymmetry of information does not involve great consequences
on the moment of signing of an agreement. The following proposition shows that
an agreement will be rapidly obtained.
12Proposition 5 In any sequential equilibrium of the game J∞
N characterised by
an asymmetry favourable to the Southern groups, the negotiations will never last
more than two periods.
This proposition is similar to the one developed by Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990). The idea is as follows: Suppose an agreement is reached at the period
n (n ∈ℵ ∗) on a proposition of the Southern group. Lemma (1) deﬁnes the
behaviour of b−. Its strategy consists in imitating the behaviour of b+ by making
t h es a m ec o u n t e r - o ﬀer. Thus, whatever the type of group, the counter-oﬀers
will be τ∗(S+,N). In addition, the North is not interested in prolonging the
negotiations until the period n, since it can accept the transfer τ∗(S+,N) at the
second period, obtaining higher earnings due to its preference for the present.
Hence, if a proposition τN is refused by both types of Southern groups, the
agreement can only emerge at the following period.
On the contrary, if the oﬀer of ﬁrst period τN is accepted by b−,t h eN o r t hc a n
determine the real characteristics of its opponent. It will then make a counter-
oﬀer τS to b+. The Southern group, not being able to rise the amount of transfers
by means of its refusal, will accept τS. Thus, the negotiation will end at the
second period.
Finally, if the oﬀer τN is a suﬃcient incentive to be accepted by the two types
of union, i.e. τN ≥ τ∗(N,S+),t h ea g r e e m e n tw i l lt a k ep l a c ea tt h eﬁrst period.
However, remark that this result is only valid for a situation where the in-
complete information is reduced to two possibilities. If the problem gets more
complicated, the agreement will no longer be reached at the second period.
Propositions (3)a n d( 4)s h o wt h a tw i t ha s y m m e t r yo fi n f o r m a t i o n ,t w oc a t -
egories of agreements are likely to be signed. We can associate a sequential
equilibrium to each of these types of agreements.
On the one hand, an agreement where b+ accepts the equilibrium transfer
obtained from the game without asymmetry of information is possible. The
equilibrium transfers is τ∗(S+,N) and b− accepts the oﬀer τN deﬁned by (13).
We call this sequential equilibrium ’separating’. The North is certain to determine
the characteristic of the Southern group. By proposing the transfer τN,o n l yb−
will accept it. In case of rejection, the North will suppose that its opponent is
b+.
On the other hand, an agreement concluded on a transfer corresponding to b+,
is highly proﬁtable for b−. This latter group obtains more than what it expected
in complete information. We ﬁnd here a ’pooling’ sequential equilibrium. The
agreement doesn’t reﬂect the type of the contracting parties.
The importance of this second case depends strongly on the beliefs of the
North. There is a monotonous relation between the value p+ and the possible
emergence of a pooling sequential equilibrium. The higher (lower) the initial belief
p+ of the North, the higher (lower) are the chances to meet an agreement with
at r a n s f e rτ∗(N,S+) from the ﬁrst negotiation round. Therefore, if the Southern
13group was able to emit in a pre-game phase a signal not corresponding to its
type, the asymmetry could quickly favour them. Keeping personal information
plays a essential role in the bargaining process.
Proposition (5) shows that time takes a new strategic dimension in the pres-
ence of asymmetry of information. In this case, time favours the Southern groups.
We have seen that the strategy of b− is to adopt opportunistic behaviour, by post-
ing demands identical to the ones requested by b+. This strategy allows it to emit
a signal not corresponding to its own type. Furthermore, even if the negotiations
continue, the North is not able to discover the real characteristic of the Southern
group. Hence, to maintain the advantage granted by the asymmetry of infor-
mation, b− has to persevere and not change its strategy. Therefore, the North
is not interested in prolonging the negotiations, since it will not be able to dis-
cover the real characteristics of its opponent. Taking into account the temporal
dimension and its asymmetry of information, the North is encouraged to quickly
conclude an agreement. Nevertheless, this conﬁguration favours b−. If the ini-
tial oﬀer of the North is judged unsatisfactory, it will make a positive proﬁt,
equal to τ∗(S+,N) − τN, since its counter-oﬀer is higher than the one it would
have requested in the absence of asymmetry of information. On the contrary, b+
will receive a transfer corresponding to its characteristics (whatever the initial
situation).
This proposition also shows that the asymmetry of information could prolong
the negotiations, although an agreement is likely to be achieved at the second
period. This delay is a consequence of the asymmetry of information, and corre-
sponds to the time needed by the North to determine the type of the Southern
group.
4.2 Multilateral negotiation
We now analyse a negotiation between the North and two distinct Southern
groups S1 and S2. When the North is confronted with the group Si (i =1 ,2)









i ) − τNi]
Bi(1 − δN)+Ci[δNτ∗(S
+
i ,N) − τ∗(N,S
−
i )]
i =1 ,2 (14)
Since we focus on conﬁgurations involving a delay during the negotiation, we
exclude the case where p
+
i >g i, (i =1 ,2).W h e np
+
i <g i (i =1 ,2) three cases
are conceivable according to the Southern groups’ characteristics.
In the ﬁrst conﬁguration the group j is of type b
−
j , and the group k is of type
b
+
k , j 6= k. Two sub-cases have to be considered. If both groups act together, they
can claim either a transfer b−, and obtain an agreement during the ﬁrst stage, or
at r a n s f e rb+, which will extend the negotiation to the second period.
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= α1 (16)
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(1 − δN)(B − Bj − Bk)
(1 − δNδS)Cj
= α2 (18)
Since it can easily be shown that α1 < α2,f o rb
−
j < α1 whatever the claim of
the union, the Southern groups favour disunity. For sub-case 1, b
+
k is confronted
with a delay while the union would lead to an agreement from the ﬁrst stage. That
delay represents the necessary time for b
+
k to separate itself from b
−
j and reveal its
demands to the North. For the latter, these demands reveal the characteristics of
b
+




k would prefer disunity
if it would obtain a higher beneﬁt by showing its type. That requires that b
−
j
concludes an agreement on a low level of transfers in the ﬁrst period.
For sub-case 2, the negotiation delay is less costly for b
+
k than in the previ-
ous case, since the delay would also appear acting together. Two simultaneous
interpretations of the delay are possible. In the case of united groups, the de-
lay represents the time needed by the North to infer the type of coalition it is
confronted by. For the case of disunity, it describes the necessary time for b
+
k
to be dissociated from b
−
j . The sub-cases (1) and (2) correspond to a situation
where the groups are complementary. This conﬁguration reinforces the bargain-
ing power of b
+
k . When it realizes that b
−
j wishes to demand a low transfer, it is
interested in extending the negotiation to obtain a higher level of transfers in the
second period.
When the inequalities (16) and (18) are inverted, we end up with a situation
where the Southern groups are substitutable and act together. For the symmetric
15sub-case (1), despite union, the negotiation goes on. The common action does
not give a suﬃciently dissuasive bargaining power to end the negotiation in the
ﬁrst round. The bargaining power of the union is compensated by the presence
of the asymmetry of information, since the North uses the delay to determine
the characteristics of the Southern group. Although the agreement is signed with
the transfer τ∗(S+,N), the union is confronted with a negotiation cost. In the
case of complete information, an agreement with a transfer τ∗(N,S+) would be
signed in the ﬁrst period.
In the second conﬁguration, we assume that the Southern group j is of type
b
+
j and the group k of type b
+
k . In this case the negotiation will end in the second




















Equation (20) corresponds to the condition of complementarity (7). It shows
that each group is interested in acting separately when their respective demands,
although high, are not enough to take a relevant part of the beneﬁt. Despite
their complementarity, each group has room to manoeuver until a certain level.
If this level is exceeded, the situation leads the groups to unite to obtain the
bargaining power allowing them to reach an agreement based on a high level of
transfers. This situation is associated to substitutability between the groups. In
both cases, we ﬁnd the initial interpretation of the negotiation delay. The delay
becomes proﬁtable to the North, it helps it to infer the characteristics of each
group or the union of groups.
Finally, in the third conﬁguration, we suppose that the group j is of type b
−
j
and the group k of type b
−
k . The delay can take place when the groups act jointly
and require b+. Disunity is proﬁtable if:







(1 − δNδS)(Cb+ − Cjb
−







(B − Bj − Bk)
Ck
(22)
The Southern groups will favour disunity within a complementarity framework
when their minima individual demands are low. That will incite them to accept
16the oﬀer of the North. Acting together their transfer demands are increased due
to their strong bargaining power. Therefore, they are interested in extending
the negotiation. Thus, the delay can be interpreted as the means to aﬃrm high
demands. The negotiation costs can be compensated by the anticipated higher
beneﬁt in terms of transfers. Hence, the groups characterised by low minimum
demands are willing to claim more by being united.
We now focus on a situation in which the beliefs of the North lead to a sepa-
rating equilibrium with one of the Southern groups and to a pooling equilibrium
with the other, i.e. p
+
j >g j and p
+
k <g k, j 6= k. In this situation, group j
(whatever its characteristics) will accept the oﬀer τ∗(N,S
+
j ) at the ﬁrst round.
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∗(N,S
+
j ) − b
−






j ),0) = [τ
∗(N,S
+
j ) − b
+
j ]Cj if Sj is of type b
+
j (24)
The utility of group k is:
Uk(τNk,0) = [τNk − b
−






k ,N),1) = δS[τ
∗(S
+
k ,N) − b
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k ]Ck if Sk is of type b
+
k (26)
The situations (23)+(25) and (23)+(26) are included in the cases previously
discussed. For the remaining situations, we limit ourselves to those in which
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k will tackle the negotiations separately. When the Southern groups
are complementary and their individual demands high, they are willing to act
separately. On the other hand, when they are substitutable, they will act jointly
and force the negotiation delay because the beliefs of the North lead it to make
a low opening proposition.
Let us now analyse the situation (24)-(26). Two cases are conceivable accord-































k bears a negotiation delay, disunity is still favoured. In the ﬁrst
case, the complementarity allows b
+
k to aﬃrm its demands by refusing the initial
oﬀer of the North. Therefore the delay allows b
+
k to obtain what it expected.
However, when they are substitutable, b
+
k is interested in joining b
+
j to increase
its bargaining power and not to bear a delay. In the second case, the Southern
groups also favour disunity instead of union. Moreover, complementarity favours
b
+
j s i n c ei ti si n d u c e dt os i g na na g r e e m e n ta so ft h eﬁrst period, whilst, being
united or acting separately, b
+
k is still confronted with a delay.
To resume, the diﬀerent conﬁg u r a t i o n sa n a l y s e dl e a dt ot h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t s :
in the presence of asymmetric information, when the Southern groups form a
union (when they are substitutable) the delay favours the North. That delay
corresponds to the time necessary for it to acquire the relevant information con-
cerning the demands of the groups. On the other hand, when the Southern groups
act separately (complementarity situation), the delay has several interpretations.
I fo n eo ft h et w oS o u t h e r ng r o u p si so ft h et y p eb+, while the other is of type b−,
the delay corresponds to the time necessary for b+ to dissociate from b−.W h e n
both groups are of type b+, the delay is used by one and/or the other group to
aﬃrm its transfer demands.
The comparison of equilibrium in complete and incomplete information in the
multilateral negotiations game gives the following proposition:
Proposition 6 When both groups are of type b
+
i , the conditions of complementarity-
substitutability in presence of asymmetric information are identical to those ob-
tained with complete information. On the contrary, when the groups have not
the same transfer demands, the conditions of complementarity (substitution) are
wider (more restrictive).
Within a multilateral negotiation with incomplete information, the existence
of an information asymmetry reinforces the bargaining power of complementary
groups and reduces the power of substitutable groups. As with complete infor-
mation, the complementarity, requiring the agreement of both groups, gives them
as i g n i ﬁcant bargaining power compelling the North to propose a high level of
transfers. In this context, the one and/or the other Southern group will take
18advantage of its private information to increase its bargaining power and obtain
an agreement on a high transfer level. The advantages of complementarity are
therefore reinforced by the lack of information of the North. The asymmetry
of information makes the conditions of complementarity obtained with complete
information less restrictive. On the contrary, in the presence of substitutable
groups, the North is interested in acquiring information on the characteristics of
the groups, in order to oppose them by searching an agreement with only one
of them. The possible race downwards leads the Southern groups to reveal their
private information reducing their bargaining power. The drawbacks of the sub-
stitutability are reinforced by the informational asymmetry since, if the Southern
groups request high transfers, the negotiations cannot be concluded in the ﬁrst
period. Thus, the conditions of substitutability are more restrictive than with
complete information.
Considering these results, the South will be interested in repeating the pattern
of the Kyoto Protocol. That is, the relatively rapid signing of a general agreement
which makes the Southern groups complementary, followed by a discussion about
the details (the Marrakech Accords in the case of the Kyoto Protocol) where the
separation in two complementary groups will give them strong bargaining power
to tackle the negotiations on the precise amount of the transfers.
Moreover, if both Southern groups have high demands, either complemen-
tary of substitute, they will never accept less than what they would obtain in
complete information. Likewise, the North will never oﬀer more than the maxi-
mum amount of transfers that it would have proposed with complete information.
As an agreement is only reached with a transfer level corresponding to the de-
mands of the Southern groups, the presence of asymmetry of information does
not beneﬁt them. Under these circumstances, the conditions of complementarity-
substitutability are identical with complete and incomplete information.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this paper has been to determine the diﬀerent forms that the
international agreements to enlarge the Kyoto Protocol to include the developing
countries might take. The main characteristics of the negotiation are the pres-
ence of asymmetry of information about the capacities of the South to reduce
their emissions and the possibility to make the negotiations last more than one
round. Although we have analysed the climate change negotiations, the frame-
work developed is wide enough to represent most of the international negotiations
between the North and the South, as long as they deal with an issue where the
North is willing to transfer money (or other economic advantages) in exchange of
some commitment by the Southern countries; and as long as available data about
t h eN o r t ha r em o r ea c c u r a t et h a nd a t aa b o u tt h eS o u t h .
In a bilateral framework, we have shown that asymmetry of information is not
19always beneﬁcial for the developing countries coalition. The industrial countries
will be interested in continuing the negotiations and may delay the moment of
an agreement to obtain information about the characteristics of the Southern
coalition. Compared to the outcome with complete information, the developing
countries will pay a negotiation cost due to the delay.
In a multilateral framework, the information asymmetry reinforces the negoti-
ation power of the complementary coalitions, which will generally act separately,
and reduces that of the substitutable coalitions, which will generally act together.
Hence, the developing countries are interested in forcing a situation where they
are complementary by setting at an early stage (pre-game) of the negotiations a
high minimum level of ratiﬁcations for the agreement to come into force (as it
was done for the Kyoto Protocol). If the southern coalitions manage to become
complementary, they will act separately but the agreement will not be reached in
the ﬁrst negotiation period. The delay can now be interpreted as the time needed
by the coalition with strong demands to dissociate from the coalition with weak
demands.
20APPENDIX
P r o o fo fl e m m a1
See Rubinstein (1985). Nevertheless, the general principle of the demonstra-
tion is as follows. Let us consider the history for which b+ and b− reject the oﬀer
of N and suggest diﬀerent oﬀers in return. Let τ∗(S+,N) be the oﬀer of b+ and
τ
−








After the Southern group has made its proposition, N is able to determine the
characteristics of its opponent.
• Behaviour of N towards b+. Faced with a proposition τ∗(S+,N), N identi-
ﬁes its opponent as being b+. Knowing that it could not propose less than
τ∗(N,S+) at the next period, it will accept the counter-oﬀer. By oﬀering
the transfer τ∗(N,S+),i t sb e n e ﬁti sn o ti n c r e a s e dc o m p a r e dt ot h a tw h i c h
i tw o u l do b t a i na c c e p t i n gτ∗(S+,N) a period later.
• Behaviour of N towards b−. Two cases are possible:
Observing τ
−
S verifying (32) and therefore strictly lower to τ∗(S+,N), N knows
that it is confronted with b−. It just has to propose in the following period
τ
−




S − ²,t +1 ) .
That strategy is proﬁt a b l ea si tc a ni m p r o v ei t sb e n e ﬁt. On the other hand, it
deteriorates simultaneously the utility of b−.
Suppose now that N accepts τ
−
S. b− is then incited to deviate as it knows
that N will also accept τ∗(S+,N). Since both oﬀers τ
−
S and τ∗(S+,N) can be
accepted, b− is interested in requesting τ∗(S+,N). ¤
P r o o fo fl e m m a2
For each of these two cases, we consider the game at any date t where the
Southern group is the proposer.
• b− makes an oﬀer τS diﬀerent from τN if the utility associated to its propo-
sition τS is strictly higher to the one obtained with τN.H o w e v e r , t h e
lemma 1 stipulates that the counter-oﬀer of b− is equal to τ∗(S+,N).T h e
condition is then written:




















21• Since b+ ≥ (1−δS)b−+b+δS,w eo b t a i n:C(τN−b+) ≤ C(τ∗(S+,N)−b+)δS.
Thus, when b− refuses τN, b+ does as much.
• Suppose b+ accepts a proposition τN. Hence:










Since b− ≤ b−δS+(1−δS)b+,w eh a v eC(τN−b−) ≥ C(τ∗(S+,N)−b−)δS. ¤
P r o o fo fl e m m a3
Suppose the Southern group does not accept τN.T h el e m m a( 1) tells us that
the two types of groups will suggest the same counter-oﬀer τS,w i t hτS ≥ b+.
However, the highest proposition the Southern group can make is τ∗(S+,N).
Hence, for any transfer τN verifying the relation τN ≥ (1−δS)b+δSτ∗(S+,N),we
have τN − b ≥ (τ∗(S+,N) − b)δS. Therefore, the Southern group will accept the
transfer τN.
Let us precise the expression of the oﬀer τN a c c o r d i n gt ot h et y p eo ft h e
Southern group. If the group is type b−,w eh a v e ,f o rb = b−: τ
−
N ≥ (1−δS)b− +
δSτ∗(S+,N) and for b = b+ : τ
+
N ≥ (1 − δS)b+ + δSτ∗(S+,N)=τ∗(N,S+).
Thus, although b− is incited to behave like b+ (according to lemma 1 and 2),
it will beneﬁt from a larger room of manoeuvre than b+ (according to lemma 3).
I.e., its set of satisfactory propositions is wider than the one of b+:
τ
−










and B ⊂ A.F o r δS → 1,w eh a v eτ = B/C. The behaviour of the Southern
groups b− and b+, coincides when b− is patient as they request both the highest
wage that N can accept. Patience allows b− to claim the requests of b+.O nt h e
other hand, if b− is impatient, its transfer demand becomes its reference transfer
for the negotiation. ¤
P r o o fo fl e m m a4
We successively present the behaviours of b−, b+ and N.:
• Behaviour of b−:
b− will accept τN if that transfer level incites it to renounce, at the next
period, to earnings associated to a proposition τ∗(S+,N). It is enough that:















• Behaviour of b+:








• Behaviour of two types of groups:
According to equation (33), b− is not interested in refusing the oﬀer τN since it
will not increase its payoﬀs by a counter-proposition τ∗(S+,N). On the contrary,
a c c o r d i n gt o( 3 4 ) ,b+ refuses τN since it can enhance its utility by proposing
τ∗(S+,N).T h u s ,f o ra no ﬀer τN verifying the condition (13), b− has to accept it
while b+ can refuse it to propose afterwards τ∗(S+,N).
• Behaviour of N:
If b− accepts the oﬀer of τN while b+ rejects it to propose afterwards τ∗(S+,N),
N is able to determine the type of its opponent. In fact, it knows that for a level of
transfers τN,v e r i f y i n g( 3 4 ) ,b− s h o u l dn o tr e j e c ti t( w h i l eb+ should). N, knowing
the type of group it is negotiating with, will accept the oﬀer τ∗(S+,N). ¤
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3









= B − τ
∗(N,S
+)C (36)
On the other hand, if it suggests the pure strategy τN verifying (13), its
expected payoﬀ becomes:
EΠ





A c c o r d i n gt ol e m m a( 4), the oﬀer will be accepted by b− and rejected by
b+. This latter will propose the transfer τ∗(S+,N), which will be accepted
by N in the second period. The strategy τN is optimal for N if and only
if: EΠ− >E Π+ (the condition 1 of proposition (3)).
23• If EΠ− <E Π+,w ea r ei nt h ec o n ﬁguration where proposing τ∗(N,S+)
is optimal for N. Since that is the highest transfer that the Southern
group can obtain in negotiations in complete information, it will accept it
whatever its type.
• If EΠ− = EΠ+, the sequential equilibrium consists for N in adopting the
mixed strategy τ∗(N,S+) with the probability α and the strategy τ∗(N,S−)
with the probability 1 −α with α ∈ [0,1]. b+ will accept the proposition if
it is at least equal to τ∗(N,S+) while b− will accept in the ﬁrst period any
proposition verifying (13). ¤.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
Since (13) is not veriﬁed, for τN = τ∗(N,S−), the expected payoﬀ of N is
written :
EΠ







By comparing the expected payoﬀs associated to each strategy, we obtain the
searched result ¤
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